Abstract. We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (spa-st). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this context. Informally, a matching is strongly stable if there is no student and lecturer l such that if they decide to form a private arrangement outside of the matching via one of l's proposed projects, then neither party would be worse off and at least one of them would strictly improve. We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st. Our algorithm runs in O(m 2 ) time, where m is the total length of the students' preference lists.
Introduction
Matching problems, which generally involve the assignment of a set of agents to another set of agents based on preferences, have wide applications in many real-world settings, including, for example, allocating junior doctors to hospitals [25] and assigning students to projects [16] . In the context of assigning students to projects, each project is proposed by one lecturer and each student is required to provide a preference list over the available projects that she finds acceptable. Also, lecturers may provide a preference list over the students that find their projects acceptable, and/or over the projects that they propose. Typically, each project and lecturer have a specific capacity denoting the maximum number of students that they can accommodate. The goal is to find a matching, i.e., an assignment of students to projects that respects the stated preferences, such that each student is assigned at most one project, and the capacity constraints on projects and lecturers are not violated -the so-called Student-Project Allocation problem (spa) [1, 6, 20] .
Two major models of spa exist in the literature: one permits preferences only from the students [16] , while the other permits preferences from the students and lecturers [1, 15] . In the latter case, three different variants have been studied based on the nature of the lecturers' preference lists. These include SPA with lecturer preferences over (i) students [15] , (ii) projects [13, 22, 23] , and (iii) (student, project) pairs [2] . Outwith assigning students to projects, applications of each of these three variants can be seen in multi-cell networks where the goal is to find a stable assignment of users to channels at base-stations [3, 4, 5] .
In this work, we will concern ourselves with variant (i), i.e., the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s). In this context, it has been argued in [25] that a natural property for a matching to satisfy is that of stability. Informally, a stable matching ensures that no student and lecturer would have an incentive to deviate from their current assignment. Abraham et al. [1] described two linear-time algorithms to find a stable matching in an instance of spa-s where the preference lists are strictly ordered. In their paper, they also proposed an extension of spa-s where the preference lists may include ties, which we refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students with Ties (spa-st).
If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lecturers, three different stability definitions are possible [9, 10, 11] . We give an informal definition in what follows. Suppose that M is a matching in an instance of spa-st. Then M is (i) weakly stable, (ii) strongly stable, or (iii) super-stable, if there is no student and lecturer l such that if they decide to become assigned outside of M via one of l's proposed projects, respectively, (i) both of them would strictly improve, (ii) one of them would be better off, and the other would not be worse off (iii) neither of them would be worse off.
These concepts were first defined and studied by Irving [9] in the context of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties (smt) (the restriction of spa-st in which each lecturer offers only one project, the capacity of each project and lecturer is 1, the numbers of students and lecturers are equal, each student finds all projects acceptable, and each lecturer finds all students acceptable). It was subsequently extended to the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) [10, 11] (where HRT is the special case of spa-st in which each lecturer offers only one project, and the capacity of each project is the same as the capacity of the lecturer offering the project).
Existing results in spa-st. Every instance of spa-st admits a weakly stable matching, which could be of different sizes [21] . Moreover, the problem of finding a maximum size weakly stable matching (MAX-SPA-ST) is NP-hard [12, 21] , even for the so-called Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti). Cooper and Manlove [7] described a [10] that super-stability is a natural and most robust solution concept to seek in cases where agents have incomplete information. Recently, Olaosebikan and Manlove [24] showed that if an instance of spa-st admits a superstable matching M , then all weakly stable matchings in the instance are of the same size (equal to the size of M ), and match exactly the same set of students. The main result of their paper was a polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable matching or report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st. Their algorithm runs in O(L) time, where L is the total length of all the preference lists.
Motivation. It was motivated in [11] that weakly stable matching may be undermined by bribery or persuasion, in practical applications of hrt. In what follows, we give a corresponding argument for an instance I of spa-st. Suppose that M is a weakly stable matching in I, and suppose that a student s i prefers a project p j (where p j is offered by lecturer l k ) to her assigned project in M , say p j ′ (where p j ′ is offered by a lecturer different from l k ). Suppose further that p j is full and l k is indifferent between s i and one of the worst student/s assigned to p j in M , say s i ′ . Clearly, the pair (s i , p j ) does not constitute a blocking pair for the weakly stable matching M , as l k would not improve by taking on s i in the place of s i ′ . However, s i might be overly invested in p j that she is even ready to persuade or even bribe l k to reject s i ′ and accept her instead; l k being indifferent between s i and s i ′ may decide to accept s i 's proposal. We can reach a similar argument if the roles are reversed. However, if M is strongly stable, it cannot be potentially undermined by this type of (student, project) pair.
Henceforth, if a spa-st instance admits a strongly stable matching, we say that such an instance is solvable. Unfortunately not every instance of spa-st is solvable. To see this, consider the case where there are two students, two projects and two lecturers, the capacity of each project and lecturer is 1, the students have exactly the same strictly ordered preference list of length 2, and each of the lecturers preference list is a single tie of length 2 (any matching will be undermined by a student and lecturer that are not matched together). However, it should be clear from the discussions above that in cases where a strongly stable matching exists, it should be preferred over a matching that is merely weakly stable.
Related work. The following are previous results for strong stability in the literature. Irving [9] gave an O(n 4 ) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings in an instance of smt, where n is the number of men (equal to the number of women). This algorithm was subsequently extended by Manlove [19] to instances of smti, which is a generalisation of smt for which the preference lists need not be complete. The extended algorithm also has running time O(n 4 ). Irving et al. [11] described an algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or report that no such matching exists, given an instance of HRT. The algorithm has running time O(m 2 ), where m is the total number of acceptable (resident, hospital) pairs. Subsequently, Kavitha et al. [14] presented two strong stability algorithms with improved running time; one for smti with running time O(nm), where n is the number of vertices and m is the number of edges, and the other for hrt with running time O(m h∈H p h ), where H is the set of all hospitals and p h is the capacity of a hospital h. These two algorithms build on the ones described in [9, 11, 19] . A recent result in strong stability is the work of Kunysz [17] , where he described an O(nm log(W n)) algorithm for computing a maximum weight strongly stable matching given an instance of smti, where W is the maximum weight of an edge.
Our contribution. We present the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st -thus solving an open problem given in [1, 24] . Our algorithm is student-oriented, which implies that if the given instance is solvable then our algorithm will output a solution in which each student has at least as good a project as she could obtain in any strongly stable matching. We note that our algorithm is a non-trivial extension of the strong stability algorithms for smt [9] , smti [19] , and hrt [11] (we discuss this further in Sect. 4.3).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We give a formal definition of the spa-s problem, the spa-st variant, and the three stability concepts in Sect. 2. We give some intuition for the strong stability definition in Sect. 3. We describe our algorithm for spa-st under strong stability in Sect. 4. Further, in Sect. 4, we also illustrate an execution of our algorithm with respect to an instance of spa-st before moving on to present the algorithm's correctness and complexity results, along with proof of correctness. Finally, we present some potential direction for future work in Sect. 5.
Preliminary definitions
In this section, we give a formal definition of spa-s as described in the literature [1] . We also give a formal definition of spa-st -a generalisation of spa-s in which preference lists can include ties.
Formal definition of spa-s
An instance I of spa-s involves a set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n1 } of students, a set P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n2 } of projects and a set L = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n3 } of lecturers. Each student s i ranks a subset of P in strict order, which forms her preference list. We say that s i finds p j acceptable if p j appears on s i 's preference list. We denote by A i the set of projects that s i finds acceptable.
Each lecturer l k ∈ L offers a non-empty set of projects P k , where P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n3 partitions P, and l k provides a preference list, denoted by L k , ranking in strict order of preference those students who find at least one project in P k acceptable. Also l k has a capacity d k ∈ Z + , indicating the maximum number of students she is willing to supervise. Similarly each project p j ∈ P has a capacity c j ∈ Z + indicating the maximum number of students that it can accommodate. We assume that for any lecturer l k , max{c j :
e., the capacity of l k is (i) at least the highest capacity of the projects offered by l k , and (ii) at most the sum of the capacities of all the projects l k is offering). We denote by L j k , the projected preference list of lecturer l k for p j , which can be obtained from L k by removing those students that do not find p j acceptable (thereby retaining the order of the remaining students from L k ).
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that (s i , p j ) ∈ M implies that s i finds p j acceptable. If (s i , p j ) ∈ M , we say that s i is assigned to p j , and p j is assigned s i . For convenience, if s i is assigned in M to p j , where p j is offered by l k , we may also say that s i is assigned to l k , and l k is assigned s i . For any project p j ∈ P, we denote by M (p j ) the set of students assigned to p j in M . Project p j is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M (p j )| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively. Similarly, for any lecturer l k ∈ L, we denote by M (l k ) the set of students assigned to l k in M . Lecturer l k is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M (l k )| is less than, equal to, or greater than
If s i is assigned to some project in M , for convenience we let M (s i ) denote that project.
Ties in the preference lists
We now give a formal definition, similar to the one given in [24] , for the generalisation of spa-s in which the preference lists can include ties. In the preference list of lecturer l k ∈ L, a set T of r students forms a tie of length r if l k does not prefer s i to s i ′ for any s i , s i ′ ∈ T (i.e., l k is indifferent between s i and s i ′ ). A tie in a student's preference list is defined similarly. For convenience, in what follows we consider a non-tied entry in a preference list as a tie of length one. We denote by spa-st the generalisation of spa-s in which the preference list of each student (respectively lecturer) comprises a strict ranking of ties, each comprising one or more projects (respectively students). An example spa-st instance I 1 is given in Fig. 1 , which involves the set of students S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, the set of projects P = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and the set of lecturers L = {l 1 , l 2 }. Ties in the preference lists are indicated by round brackets.
Student preferences
Lecturer preferences s1: (p1 p2) l1: s3 (s1 s2) l1 offers p1, p2 s2: p2 p3 l2: (s3 s2) l2 offers p3 s3: p3 p1
Project capacities: c1 = c2 = c3 = 1 Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 1 In the context of spa-st, we assume that all notation and terminology carries over from spas with the exception of stability, which we now define. When ties appear in the preference lists, three types of stability arise, namely weak stability, strong stability and super-stability [10, 11] .
In what follows, we give a formal definition of these three stability concepts in the context of spa-st. Henceforth, I is an instance of spa-st, (s i , p j ) is an acceptable pair in I and l k is the lecturer who offers p j . Definition 1 (weak stability [7] ). Let M be a matching in I. We say that M is weakly stable if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair of M is an acceptable pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S ×P)\M such that (a) and (b) holds as follows: 
or is indifferent between them; (iii) p j is full and l k prefers s i to the worst student/s in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them.
Definition 3 (strong stability).
We say that M is strongly stable in I if it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair of M is an acceptable pair (s i , p j ) ∈ (S × P) \ M such that either (1a and 1b) or (2a and 2b) holds as follows:
, or (iii) holds as follows: (i) p j is undersubscribed and l k is undersubscribed; (ii) p j is undersubscribed, l k is full, and either s i ∈ M (l k ) or l k prefers s i to the worst student/s in M (l k ) or is indifferent between them; (iii) p j is full and l k prefers s i to the worst student/s in M (p j ) or is indifferent between them.
, and l k prefers s i to the worst student/s in M (l k ); (iii) p j is full and l k prefers s i to the worst student/s in M (p j ).
In the remainder of this paper, any usage of the term blocking pair refers to the version of this term for strong stability as defined in Definition 3. We give an intuition behind the strong stability definition is what follows.
Justification of the strong stability definition
It should be clear from our definition of a blocking pair (s i , p j ) that if s i seeks to become assigned to p j outside of M , then at most one of s i and l k can be indifferent to the switch, whilst at least one of them must strictly improve. In what follows, we justify our definition in more detail (we remark that some of the argument is similar to that given for the blocking pair definition in the spa-s case [1, Sect 2.2]).
We consider the first part of the definition. In Definition 3(1a); clearly if the assignment between s i and p j is permitted, s i will improve relative to M . Now, let us consider l k 's perspective. In Definition 3(1b)(i), l k will be willing to take on s i for p j , since there is a free space. In Definition 3(1b)(ii), if s i was already assigned in M to a project offered by l k then l k will agree to the switch, since the total number of students assigned to l k remains the same. However, if s i was not already assigned in M to a project offered by l k , since l k is full, l k will need to reject some student assigned to her in order to take on s i . Obviously, l k will not reject a student that she prefers to s i ; thus l k will either improve or be no worse off after the switch. Finally, in Definition 3(1b)(iii), since p j is full, l k will need to reject some student assigned to p j in order to take on s i . Again, l k will either improve or be no worse off after the switch. Under this definition, as observed in [1, Sect 2.2], if s i was already assigned in M to a project offered by l k , then the number of students assigned to l k will decrease by 1 (the reason for this was further justified in [1, Sect 6.1]).
Next, we consider the second part of the definition. In Definition 3(2a), if the assignment between s i and p j is permitted, clearly s i will be no worse off after the switch. Again, we consider l k 's perspective (we note that in this case, l k must improve after the switch.). In Definition 3(2b)(i), if p j and l k is undersubscribed, then the only way that l k would improve is if s i is not already assigned in M to a project offered by l k . If this is the case, then l k will agree to the switch since there is a free space and she will get one more student to supervise, namely s i . In Definition 3(2b)(ii), if p j is undersubscribed and l k is full, the only way l k could improve is first for s i to not be assigned in M to a project offered by l k . If this is the case then l k will need to reject some student assigned to her in M in order to take on s i . Obviously, l k will be willing to reject a student that is worse than s i on her list. Similarly, in Definition 3(2b)(iii), if p j is full in M , l k will need to reject some student assigned to p j in M in order to take on s i . Clearly, l k must prefer s i to such student so that l k can have a better set of students assigned to p j after the switch. We remark that if s i is already assigned in M to a project offered by l k , the number of students assigned to l k in M will decrease by 1 after the switch.
We illustrate this using the example spa-st instance I 2 in Fig. 2 . Clearly,
} is a matching in I 2 . However, by satisfying the blocking pair (s 1 , p 1 ), we obtain the matching M 2 = {(s 1 , p 1 )}, which is strongly stable. In going from M 1 to M 2 , lecturer l 1 got a better student to take on p 1 , with l 1 having to lose one student, namely s 2 . Following a similar argument as in [1, Sect 6.1] for the spa-s case, in practice, l 1 might not agree to take on s 1 for p 1 , since in doing so l 1 loses a student. So, one could relax Definition 3(2b)(iii) to prevent such change from happening. Further, we argue that this could lead to two new problems.
1. We introduce an element of strategy into the problem by allowing a matching such as M 1 to be strongly stable. That is, a student could provide a shorter preference list in order to obtain a more suitable project. To illustrate this, suppose that s 1 has only listed p 1 in the example instance I 2 . Irrespective of how we relax Definition 3(2b)(iii), s i would be assigned to p 1 . However, this strategy might not be beneficial for a student in all cases, since by not listing all of her acceptable projects, a student is at risk of not being assigned in the final strongly stable matching. 2. If we allow both M 1 and M 2 to be strongly stable, this would imply that the instance admits strongly stable matchings of different sizes. Hence, we would seek a maximum size strongly stable matching in order to match as many students to projects as possible. However, we conjecture that this problem is NP-hard, following from related problems of finding maximum size stable matching in the literature.
An algorithm for spa-st under strong stability
In this section we present our algorithm for spa-st under strong stability, which we will refer to as Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. In Sect. 4.1, we give some definitions relating to the algorithm. In Sect. 4.2, we give a description of our algorithm and present it in pseudocode form. In Sect. 4.3, we briefly describe the non-trivial modifications that are involved in extending the existing strong stability algorithms for smt [9] , smti [19] and hrt [11] to our algorithm for the spa-st case. We illustrate an execution of our algorithm with respect to a spa-st instance in Sect. 4.4. Finally, in Sect. 4.5, we present our algorithm's correctness results along with proof of correctness.
Definitions relating to the algorithm
Given a pair (s i , p j ) ∈ M , for some strongly stable matching M in I, we call (s i , p j ) a strongly stable pair. During the execution of the algorithm, students become provisionally assigned to projects (and implicitly to lecturers), and it is possible for a project (and lecturer) to be provisionally assigned a number of students that exceeds its capacity. We describe a project (respectively lecturer) as replete if at any time during the execution of the algorithm it has been full or oversubscribed. We say that a project (respectively lecturer) is non-replete if it is not replete. As stated earlier, for a project p j , it is possible that d G (p j ) > c j at some point during the algorithm's execution. Thus, we denote by q j = min{c j , d G (p j )} the quota of p j in G, which is the minimum between p j 's capacity and the number of students provisionally assigned to p j in G. Similarly, for a lecturer l k , it is possible that d G (l k ) > d k at some point during the algorithm's execution. At this point, we denote by α k = {q j : p j ∈ P k ∩ P } the total quota of projects offered by l k that is provisionally assigned to students in G and we denote by
The algorithm proceeds by deleting from the preference lists certain (s i , p j ) pairs that are not strongly stable. By the term delete (s i , p j ), we mean the removal of p j from s i 's preference list and the removal of s i from L j k (the projected preference list of lecturer l k for p j ); in addition, if (s i , p j ) ∈ E we delete the edge from G. By the head and tail of a preference list at a given point we mean the first and last tie respectively on that list after any deletions might have occurred (recalling that a tie can be of length 1). Given a project p j , we say that a student s i is dominated in L j k if s i is worse than at least c j students who are provisionally assigned to p j . The concept of a student becoming dominated in a lecturer's preference list is defined in a slightly different manner. L k ) . At a given point during the algorithm's execution, let α k and d G (l k ) be as defined above. We say that a student
Definition 4 (Dominated in
, and s i is worse than at least d k students who are provisionally assigned in G to a project offered by l k .
Definition 5 (Lower rank edge). We define an edge (s
Definition 6 (Bound). Given an edge (s i , p j ) ∈ E, we say that s i is bound to p j if (i) and (ii) holds as follows:
student vertex is then removed from G r . Finally, if the quota of any project is reduced to 0, or p j becomes an isolated vertex, then p j is removed from G r . For each surviving p j in G r , we denote by q * j the revised quota of p j , where q * j is the difference between p j 's quota in G (i.e., q j ) and the number of students that are bound to p j . Similarly, we denote by q * k the revised quota of l k in G r , where q * k is the difference between l k 's quota in G (i.e., q k ) and the number of students that are bound to a project offered by l k . Further, for each l k who offers at least one project in G r , we let n = {q *
where n is the difference between the total revised quota of projects in G r that are offered by l k and the revised quota of l k in G r . Now, if n ≤ 0, we do nothing; otherwise, we extend G r as follows. We add n dummy student vertices to S r . For each of these dummy vertex, say s di , and for each project p j ∈ P k ∩ P r that is adjacent to a student vertex in S r via a lower rank edge, we add the edge (s di , p j ) to E r .
5
Given a set X ⊆ S r of students, define N (X), the neighbourhood of X, to be the set of project vertices adjacent in G r to a student in X. If for all subsets X of S r , each student in X can be assigned to one project in N (X), without exceeding the revised quota of each project in N (X) (i.e., |X| ≤ {q * j : p j ∈ N (X)} for all X ⊆ S r ); then we say G r admits a perfect matching that saturates S r .
Definition 7 (Critical set).
It is well known in the literature [18] that if G r does not admit a perfect matching that saturates S r , then there must exist a deficient subset Z ⊆ S r such that |Z| > {q * j : p j ∈ N (Z)}. To be precise, the deficiency of Z is defined by δ(Z) = |Z| − {q * j :
1 If a student si is provisionally assigned in G to two different projects offered by l k then, potentially, dG(l k ) < α k . Thus, it is important that we take the minimum of these two parameters, to avoid deleting strongly stable pairs. 2 An edge (si, pj) ∈ E can change state from bound to unbound, but not vice versa. 3 We note that we only remove this edge to form Gr, we do not delete the edge from G. 4 If si is bound to more than one projects offered by l k , for all the bound edges involving si and these projects that we remove from Gr, we only reduce l k 's quota in Gr by one. 5 An intuition as to why we add dummy students to Gr is as follows. Given a lecturer l k whose project is provisionally assigned to a student in Gr. If q * k < {q * j : pj ∈ P k ∩ Pr}, then we need n dummy students to offset the difference between {q * j : pj ∈ P k ∩ Pr} and q * k , so that we don't oversubscribe l k in any maximum matching obtained from Gr.
, is the maximum deficiency taken over all subsets of S r . Thus, if δ(Z) = δ(G r ), we say that Z is a maximally deficient subset of S r , and we refer to Z as a critical set.
We denote by P R the set of replete projects in G and we denote by P * R a subset of projects in P R which is obtained as follows. For each project p j ∈ P R , let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . For each student s i such that (s i , p j ) has been deleted, we add p j to P * R if (i) and (ii) holds as follows:
Definition 8 (Feasible matching).
A feasible matching in the final provisional assignment graph G is a matching M which is obtained as follows:
1. Let G * be the subgraph of G induced by the students who are adjacent to a project in P * R . First, find a maximum matching M * in G * ; 6 2. Using M * as an initial solution, find a maximum matching M in G.
Description of the algorithm
Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, described in Algorithm 1, begins by initialising an empty bipartite graph G which will contain the provisional assignments of students to projects (and intuitively to lecturers). We remark that such assignments (i.e., edges in G) can subsequently be broken during the algorithm's execution. The while loop of the algorithm involves each student s i who is not adjacent to any project in G and who has a non-empty list applying in turn to each project p j at the head of her list. Immediately, s i becomes provisionally assigned to p j in G (and to l k ). If, by gaining a new provisional assignee, project p j becomes full or oversubscribed then we set p j as replete. Further, for each student s t in L j k , such that s t is dominated in L j k , we delete the pair (s t , p j ). As we will prove later, such pairs cannot belong to any strongly stable matching. Similarly, if by gaining a new provisional assignee, l k becomes full or oversubscribed then we set l k as replete. For each student s t in L k , such that s t is dominated in L k and for each project p u ∈ P k that s t finds acceptable, we delete the pair (s t , p u ). This continues until every student is provisionally assigned to one or more projects or has an empty list. At the point where the while loop terminates, we form the reduced assignment graph G r and we find the critical set Z of students in G r (Lemma 3 describes how to find Z). As we will see later, no project p j ∈ N (Z) can be assigned to any student in the tail of L j k in any strongly stable matching, so all such pairs are deleted. At the termination of the inner repeat-until loop in line 21, i.e., when Z is empty, if some project p j that is replete ends up undersubscribed, we let s r be any one of the most preferred students (according to L j k ) who was provisionally assigned to p j during some iteration of the algorithm but is not assigned to p j at this point (for convenience, we henceforth refer to such s r as the most preferred student rejected from p j according to L j k ). If the students at the tail of L k (recalling that the tail of L k is the least-preferred tie in L k after any deletions might have occurred) are no better than s r , it turns out that none of these students s t can be assigned to any 6 At the point in the algorithm when we need to construct the feasible matching M from G, if P * R is non-empty, this phase ensures that we fill up all of the projects in P * R to avoid a potential blocking pair involving some student that has been rejected by some project in P * R .
project offered by l k in any strongly stable matching -such pairs (s t , p u ), for each project p u ∈ P k that s t finds acceptable, are deleted. The repeat-until loop is then potentially reactivated, and the entire process continues until every student is provisionally assigned to a project or has an empty list.
At the termination of the outer repeat-until loop in line 30, if a student is adjacent in G to a project p j via a bound edge, then we may potentially carry out extra deletions as follows. First, we let l k be the lecturer that offers p j and we let U be the set of projects that are adjacent to s i in G via an unbound edge. For each project p u ∈ U \ P k , it turns out that the pair (s i , p u ) cannot belong to any strongly stable matching, thus we delete all such pairs. Finally, we let M be any feasible matching in the provisional assignment graph G. If M is strongly stable relative to the given instance I then M is output as a strongly stable matching in I. Otherwise, the algorithm reports that no strongly stable matching exists in I. We present Algorithm SPA-ST-strong in pseudocode form in Algorithm 1.
Finding the critical set. Consider the reduced assignment graph G r = (S r , P r , E r ) formed from G at a given point during the algorithm's execution (at line 15). To find the critical set of students in G r , first we need to construct a maximum matching M r in G r , with respect to the revised quota q * j , for each p j ∈ P r . In this context, a matching M r ⊆ E r is such that |M r (s i )| ≤ 1 for all s i ∈ S r , and |M r (p j )| ≤ q * j for all p j ∈ P r . We describe how to construct M r as follows: 1. Let G If a student s i is not assigned to any project in M r , we say that vertex s i is free in G r . Similarly, if a project p j is such that p j has fewer than q * j assignees in M r , we say that vertex p j is free in G r . An alternating path in G r relative to M r is any simple path in which edges are alternately in, and not in, M r . An augmenting path in G r is an alternating path from a free student to a free project. The following lemmas are classical results with respect to matchings in bipartite graphs.
Lemma 1. A matching M r in a reduced assignment graph G r has maximum cardinality if and only if there is no augmenting path relative to
M r in G r .
Lemma 2. Let M r be a maximum matching in the reduced assignment graph
The classical augmenting path algorithm can be used to obtain M r , and as explained in [11] , this can be implemented to run in O(min{n, c j }m) time, where n is the number of students and m is the total length of the students' preference lists. Now that we have described how to construct a maximum matching in the reduced assignment graph, the following lemma tells us how to find the critical set of students.
Lemma 3.
Given a maximum matching M r in the reduced assignment graph G r , the critical set Z consists of the set U of unassigned students together with the set U ′ of students reachable from a student in U via an alternating path.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm SPA-ST-strong
Input: spa-st instance I Output: a strongly stable matching in I or "no strongly stable matching exists in I" 1: G ← ∅ 2: repeat 3:
while some student si is unassigned and has a non-empty list do 5:
for each project pj at the head of si's list do 6:
l k ← lecturer who offers pj 7:
add the edge (si, pj) to G 8:
if pj is full or oversubscribed then 9:
for each student st dominated in L j k do 10:
delete (st, pj) 11:
if l k is full or oversubscribed then 12:
for each student st dominated in L k do 13:
for each project pu ∈ P k ∩ At do 14: delete (st, pu) 15:
form the reduced assignment graph Gr 16:
find the critical set Z of students 17:
for each project pu ∈ N (Z) do 18:
l k ← lecturer who offers pu 19:
for each student st at the tail of
until Z is empty 22:
for each pj ∈ P do 23:
if pj is replete and pj is undersubscribed then 24:
l k ← lecturer who offers pj 25:
if the students at the tail of L k are no better than sr then 27:
for each student st at the tail of L k do 28:
for each project pu ∈ P k ∩ At do 29:
delete (st, pu) 30: until every unassigned student has an empty list 31: for each student si in G do 32:
if si is adjacent in G to a project pj via a bound edge then 33:
l k ← lecturer who offers pj 34:
U ← unbound projects adjacent to si in G 35:
for each pu ∈ U \ P k do 36:
delete (si, pu) 37: M ← a feasible matching in G 38: if M is a strongly stable matching in I then 39:
return M 40: else 41:
return "no strongly stable matching exists in I"
Proof. First, we note that δ(
Inequality 1 implies that there is a project p j ∈ N (C) such that p j has fewer than q * j assignees in M r ; thus p j is free in M r . We claim that every student that is assigned in G r to a project p j ′ ∈ N (C) must be in C. For suppose there is a student s i / ∈ C such that s i is assigned to p j ′ in M r . Since p j ′ ∈ N (C), then p j ′ must be adjacent to some student s i ′ ∈ C. Now, if s i ′ ∈ U , then there is an alternating path from s i ′ to s i via p j ′ , a contradiction. Otherwise, if s i ′ ∈ U ′ , since s i ′ is reachable from a student in U via an alternating path, s i is also reachable from the same student in U via an alternating path. Hence our claim is established. Now, given that p j has fewer than q * j assignees in M r , since each student in U ′ is reachable from a student in U via an alternating path, and the students in U ∪ U ′ are collectively adjacent to projects in N (C), we can find an alternating path from a student in U to p j . Thus M r admits an augmenting path, contradicting the maximality of M r .
Further, the critical set Z must contain every student who is unassigned in some maximum matching in G r . For, suppose not. Let M * r be an arbitrary such matching (where |M * r | = |S r | − δ(G r )), and suppose there is some student s i ∈ S r \ Z such that s i is unassigned in M * r . There must be δ(G r ) unassigned students, with at most δ(G r ) − 1 of these students contained in Z (since s i / ∈ Z). Hence Z contains at least |Z| − δ(G r ) + 1 assigned students. It follows that
contradicting the required deficiency of Z. But, for every s i ∈ U ′ , there is a maximum matching in which s i is unassigned, obtainable from M r via an alternating path from a student in U to s i . Hence C ⊆ Z; and since δ(C) = δ(Z), this completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
The non-triviality of extending Algorithm HRT-strong to spa-st
Algorithm SPA-ST-strong is a non-trivial extension of Algorithm HRT-strong for hrt [11] . Here we outline the major distinctions between our algorithm and Algorithm HRT-strong, which indicate the challenges involved in extending the earlier approach to the spa-st setting.
1. Given a lecturer l k , it is possible that during some iteration of our algorithm, some p j ∈ P k is oversubscribed which causes l k to become full or oversubscribed (see Fig. 4 (a) in Sect. 4.4, at the point where s 3 applies to p 1 ). Finding the dominated students in L k becomes more complex in spa-st -to achieve this we introduced the notion of quota (i.e., q k ) for l k . 2. To form G r in the spa-st case, we extended the approach described in the hrt case [11] by introducing the concept of lower rank edges for each lecturer who offers a project in G r , and we also introduced dummy students. 3. Lines 22 -29 of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong refer to additional deletions that must be carried out in a certain situation; this type of deletion was also carried out in Algorithm SPA-ST-super for super-stability [24] (see the description corresponding to Fig. 5 in Sect. 4.4 for an example showing why we may need to carry out this type of deletion in the strong stability context). 4. Constructing a feasible matching M in G in the spa-st setting is much more challenging: we first identify some replete projects that must be full in M , denoted by P * R (see the description corresponding to Fig. 6 in Sect. 4.4). Also, in the hrt case, when constructing M from G, preference is given to a bound edge over an unbound edge; in general, this is not always true in the spa-st case.
Example algorithm execution
In this section, we illustrate an execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong with respect to the spa-st instance I 3 shown in Fig. 3 , which involves the set of students S = {s i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 8}, the set of projects P = {p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ 6} and the set of lecturers L = {l k : 1 ≤ k ≤ 3}. The algorithm starts by initialising the bipartite graph G = {}, which will contain the provisional assignment of students to projects. We assume that the students become provisionally assigned to each project at the head of their list in subscript order. Figs. 4, 5 and 6 illustrate how this execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong proceeds with respect to I 3 .
Student preferences
Lecturer preferences offers s1: p1 p6
Project capacities:
Lecturer capacities: d1 = d3 = 3, d2 = 2 
Iteration 1:
At the termination of the while loop during the first iteration of the inner repeat-until loop, every student, except s 3 , s 6 and s 7 , is provisionally assigned to every project in the first tie on their preference list. Edge (s 3 , p 4 ) / ∈ G (1) because (s 3 , p 4 ) was deleted as a result of s 6 becoming provisionally assigned to p 4 , causing s 3 to be dominated in L 
because (s 6 , p 2 ) was deleted as a result of s 4 becoming provisionally assigned to p 2 , causing s 6 to be dominated in L 1 (at that point in the algorithm, min{d G (l 1 ), α 1 } = min{4, 3} = 3 = d 1 and s 6 is worse than at least d 1 students who are provisionally assigned to l 1 ). Finally, edge (s 7 , p 3 ) / ∈ G (1) because (s 7 , p 3 ) was deleted as a result of s 5 becoming provisionally assigned to p 5 , causing s 7 to be dominated in L 3 2 . To form G (1) r , the bound edges (s 5 , p 3 ), (s 6 , p 4 ), (s 7 , p 1 ) and (s 8 , p 5 ) are removed from the graph. We can verify that edges (s 4 , p 2 ) and (s 5 , p 2 ) are unbound, since they are lower rank edges for l 1 p 1 ), (s 2 , p 1 ) and (s 3 , p 1 ) are unbound. Further, the revised quota of l 1 in G
(1) = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, thus we delete the edges (s 1 , p 1 ), (s 2 , p 1 ) and (s 3 , p 1 ) from G (1) ; and the inner repeat-until loop is reactivated. 
Iteartion 2:
At the beginning of this iteration, each of s 1 and s 2 is unassigned and has a nonempty list; thus we add edges (s 1 , p 6 ) and (s 2 , p 2 ) to the provisional assignment graph obtained at the termination of iteration (1) to form G (2) r . It can be verified that every edge in G (2) r , except (s 4 , p 2 ) and (s 5 , p 2 ), is a bound edge. Clearly, the critical set Z (2) = ∅, thus the inner repeat-until loop terminates. At this point, project p 1 , which was replete during iteration (1) , is undersubscribed in iteration (2) . Moreover, the students at the tail of L 1 (i.e., s 4 and s 5 ) are no better than s 3 , where s 3 is one of the most preferred students rejected from p 1 according to L 1 1 ; thus we delete edges (s 4 , p 2 ) and (s 5 , p 2 ). The outer repeat-until loop is then reactivated (since s 4 is unassigned and has a non-empty list). 
Iteration 3:
At the beginning of this iteration, the only student that is unassigned and has a non-empty list is s 4 ; thus we add edges (s 4 , p 5 ) and (s 4 , p 6 ) to the provisional assignment graph obtained at the termination of iteration (2) Again, every unassigned students has an empty list. We also have that a project p 2 , which was replete in iteration (2) , is undersubscribed in iteration (3). However, no further deletion is carried out in line 29 of the algorithm, since the student at the tail of L 1 (i.e., s 2 ) is better than s 4 
Correctness of the algorithm
We now present the following results regarding the correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. The first of these results deals with the fact that no strongly stable pair is ever deleted during the execution of the algorithm. Proof. Suppose that (s i , p j ) is the first strongly stable pair to be deleted within the inner repeat-until loop during an arbitrary execution E of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. Let M * be some strongly stable matching in which s i is assigned to p j . Let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . Suppose that G is the provisional assignment graph immediately after the deletion of (s i , p j ). There are three cases to consider. 14) because some other student became provisionally assigned to a project offered by l k during E, causing l k to become full or oversubscribed, so that s i is dominated in L k . We denote by C k the set of projects that are full or oversubscribed in G, which are offered by l k . We denote by D k the set of projects that are undersubscribed in G, which are offered by l k . Clearly the projects offered by l k that are provisionally assigned to a student in G at this point can be partitioned into C k and D k . We consider two subcases.
(i) Each student who is provisionally assigned in G to a project in D k (if any) is also assigned to that same project in M * . However, after the deletion of (s i , p j ), we know that
i.e., the total quota of projects in C k ∪ D k is at least the capacity of l k . Now, since p j has one more assignee in M * than it has provisional assignees in G, namely s i , then some other project p j ′ ∈ C k must have fewer than c j ′ assignees in M * , for otherwise l k would be oversubscribed in M * . This implies that there is some student, say s r , such that l k prefers s r to s i and (s r , p j ′ ) ∈ G \ M * . Moreover, s r cannot be assigned to a project that she prefers to p j ′ in M * , as explained in (1) 3. Suppose that (s i , p j ) is deleted (in line 20) because p j is provisionally assigned to a student in the critical set Z at some point, and at that point s i is in the tail of L j k . We refer to the set of preference lists at that point as the current lists. Let Z ′ be the set of students in Z who are assigned in M * to a project from the head of their current lists, and let P ′ be the set of projects in N (Z) assigned in M * to at least one student from the tail of its current list. We have that p j ∈ P ′ , so P ′ = ∅. Consider s i ′ ∈ Z. Now s i ′ cannot be assigned in M * to a project that she prefers to any project in the head of her current list, for otherwise some strongly stable pair must have been deleted before (s i , p j ). Hence, any student s i ′ in Z who is provisionally assigned to p j must be in
We now claim that there must be an edge ( Let l z0 = l k , p t0 = p j ′ and s q0 = s i ′ . Again, none of the students who are provisionally assigned to some project in G can be assigned to any project better than their current assignment in any strongly stable matching as this would mean a strongly stable pair must have been deleted before (s i , p j ), as each student apply to projects in the head of her list. So Just before the deletion of (s i , p j ) occurred, p t0 is undersubscribed in G. Since p t0 is full in M * , it follows that there exists some student, say s q1 , such that (s q1 , p t0 ) ∈ M * \ G. We note that l z0 prefers s q1 to s q0 . Let p t1 = p t0 . Since (s i , p j ) is the first strongly stable pair to be deleted, s q1 is provisionally assigned in G to a project p t2 such that s q1 prefers p t2 to p t1 . For otherwise, as students apply to projects in the head of their list, that would mean (s q1 , p t1 ) must have been deleted during an iteration of the inner repeat-until loop, a contradiction. We note that p t2 = p t1 , since (s q1 , p t2 ) ∈ G and (s q1 , p t1 ) / ∈ G. Let l z1 be the lecturer who offers p t2 . By the strong stability of M * , it follows that either (i) p t2 is full in M * and l z1 prefers the worst student/s in M * (p t2 ) to s q1 , or
Let S 1 and S 2 denote the set of students who are assigned to a project in M and M * respectively. By Lemma 8, each student who is provisionally assigned to a project in the final provisional assignment graph G must be assigned to a project in M . Moreover, any student who is not provisionally assigned to a project in G must have an empty list. It follows that these students are unassigned in M * , since Lemma 4 guarantees that no strongly stable pairs are deleted. Thus |S 2 | ≤ |S 1 |. Further, we have that
From Inequality 3 and 4, it follows that |M (l k )| = |M * (l k )| for each l k ∈ L. ⊓ ⊔
The next three lemmas deal with the case that Algorithm SPA-ST-strong reports the nonexistence of a strongly stable matching in I. Moreover, we have that
for otherwise, no strongly stable matching exists by Lemma 10. Now, if some student is bound to more than one project offered by different lecturers, by considering how the lecturers' quotas are reduced when the students in S 1 are removed in forming G r from G, it follows that
where
is the number of students that are bound to at least one project offered by a lecturer in L 1 and L 2 respectively. By substituting Equality 9 into Inequality 10, we obtain the following
Conclusion
We leave open the formulation of a lecturer-oriented counterpart to Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. From an experimental perspective, an interesting direction would be to carry out an empirical analysis of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, to investigate how various parameters (e.g., the density and position of ties in the preference lists, the length of the preference lists, or the popularity of some projects) affect the existence of a strongly stable matching, based on randomly generated and/or real instances of spa-st.
